While modern skepticism is closely associated with doubt, it's important to note that doubt isn't a feature of Pyrrhonism. For example, in the surviving works of the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus, none of the Greek words for doubt appear - which is not to say that one won't find "doubt" used in English translations. This is a translator's projection onto the meaning of the text, specifically the meaning of the Greek term "aporia," which means an impasse, in the sense that we remain perplexed about an issue.
Also, some people might be misled by "Greek skepticism often led to a form of intellectual detachment." That's true in the sense that it leads to the opposite of intellectual attachment (aka dogmatism), but it's not a detachment from intellectual pursuit. Inquiry, investigation, and curiosity are the central features of Greek skepticism - so much so that the Greek word we derive "skepticism" from means "inquiry." So what the Greeks meant by "skepticism" is much closer to what the Indians meant by "vipassanā" than to what we mean by "doubt."
Sextus Empiricus can be paraphrased as saying that the Pyrrhonist spiritual exercises allow the practitioner to be liberated from the conceits and delusions of dogmatism, allowing a clear seeing of the appearances. This clear seeing allows one to follow right reason and to live rightly, both with respect to virtue and in the ordinary sense.
This is a great clarification of the distinction between doubt and aporia in Pyrrhonism. It’s interesting how modern interpretations often conflate skepticism with a kind of radical doubt, whereas Sextus Empiricus presents it as a suspension of judgment (epoché) rather than a denial or rejection. The comparison to vipassanā is also thought-provoking—both involve a form of clear seeing that cuts through attachment to fixed views. Would you say that Pyrrhonist skepticism, like vipassanā, also has a liberative function, not just intellectually but in a more existential sense?
While modern skepticism is closely associated with doubt, it's important to note that doubt isn't a feature of Pyrrhonism. For example, in the surviving works of the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus, none of the Greek words for doubt appear - which is not to say that one won't find "doubt" used in English translations. This is a translator's projection onto the meaning of the text, specifically the meaning of the Greek term "aporia," which means an impasse, in the sense that we remain perplexed about an issue.
Also, some people might be misled by "Greek skepticism often led to a form of intellectual detachment." That's true in the sense that it leads to the opposite of intellectual attachment (aka dogmatism), but it's not a detachment from intellectual pursuit. Inquiry, investigation, and curiosity are the central features of Greek skepticism - so much so that the Greek word we derive "skepticism" from means "inquiry." So what the Greeks meant by "skepticism" is much closer to what the Indians meant by "vipassanā" than to what we mean by "doubt."
Sextus Empiricus can be paraphrased as saying that the Pyrrhonist spiritual exercises allow the practitioner to be liberated from the conceits and delusions of dogmatism, allowing a clear seeing of the appearances. This clear seeing allows one to follow right reason and to live rightly, both with respect to virtue and in the ordinary sense.
This is a great clarification of the distinction between doubt and aporia in Pyrrhonism. It’s interesting how modern interpretations often conflate skepticism with a kind of radical doubt, whereas Sextus Empiricus presents it as a suspension of judgment (epoché) rather than a denial or rejection. The comparison to vipassanā is also thought-provoking—both involve a form of clear seeing that cuts through attachment to fixed views. Would you say that Pyrrhonist skepticism, like vipassanā, also has a liberative function, not just intellectually but in a more existential sense?